Research | Journal Articles

This paper draws on regulatory governance scholarship to argue that the analytic phenomenon currently known as ‘Big Data’ can be understood as a mode of ‘design-based’ regulation. Although Big Data decision-making technologies can take the form of automated decision-making systems, this paper focuses on algorithmic decision-guidance techniques. By highlighting correlations between data items that would not otherwise be observable, these techniques are being used to shape the informational choice context in which individual decision-making occurs, with the aim of channelling attention and decision-making in directions preferred by the ‘choice architect’. By relying upon the use of ‘nudge’ – a particular form of choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives, these techniques constitute a ‘soft’ form of design-based control. But, unlike the static Nudges popularised by Thaler and Sunstein [(2008). Nudge. London: Penguin Books] such as placing the salad in front of the lasagne to encourage healthy eating, Big Data analytic nudges are extremely powerful and potent due to their networked, continuously updated, dynamic and pervasive nature (hence ‘hypernudge’). I adopt a liberal, rights-based critique of these techniques, contrasting liberal theoretical accounts with selective insights from science and technology studies (STS) and surveillance studies on the other. I argue that concerns about the legitimacy of these techniques are not satisfactorily resolved through reliance on individual notice and consent, touching upon the troubling implications for democracy and human flourishing if Big Data analytic techniques driven by commercial self-interest continue their onward march unchecked by effective and legitimate constraints.

This is a reply to Steve Latham’s Article for the Republicanism special issue.

Although the use of “design-based” control techniques, broadly understood as the purposeful shaping of the environment and the things and beings within it towards particular ends, have been used throughout human history, until the publication of Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), they have remained relatively neglected as a focus of regulatory scholarship. Nudge can be understood as a design-based regulatory technique because it provides the means by which a choice architect intentionally seeks to influence another’s behavior through the conscious design of the choice environment. But there are other forms of choice architecture besides nudge. The gunman who offers his victim “your money or your life?” is as much a choice architect as the cafeteria manager who places the fruit at eye level while placing the chocolate cake further back to encourage patrons to make healthier dietary choices and the supermarket owner who slashes grocery prices on their “use by” date to stimulate sales. This paper focuses on three forms of choice architecture – coercion, inducements and nudge, employed by the state in order to influence the behavior of others. It seeks to evaluate whether each form of choice architecture coheres with the fundamental values and premises upon which liberal democratic states rest and can therefore be properly characterized as “libertarian.” Chief among these values is the importance of individual liberty and freedom and the concomitant special status accorded to individual choice in liberal democratic communities. In so doing, it highlights different ways in which these techniques may be regarded as an interference with individual freedom, and the conditions under which such interferences might be rendered acceptable or otherwise justified.

Background:
The egregious failings in patient safety at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust between 2005 and 2009 identified by Sir Robert Francis QC in his public inquiry prompted him to recommend the introduction of a new criminal offence into English law in circumstances where a patient dies or is seriously harmed by a breach of fundamental standards. The authors evaluate whether, from the perspective of fairness and justice, a new criminal offence in this context is necessary and desirable.

Methods:
The authors considered the basic principles and functions of the criminal law and compared them with the principles and functions of the civil law. They then identify two primary tasks for the criminal law to perform in healthcare settings: (a) to establish primary duties to patients consisting of appropriately graded offences targeted at conduct that harms patients or unjustifiably poses risks to patients, and (b) to establish secondary duties to patients, consisting of offences aimed at punishing and deterring instances in which healthcare management and workers undermine the goals of regulation by lying or giving misleading information to regulatory officials or by obstructing their work. The authors focus on the first of these functions, identifying the scope of existing regulatory schemes that may give rise to criminal liability in English law when applied to healthcare contexts to identify whether a new criminal offence is needed.

Results:
A gap in the existing regime of criminal liability is identified, and it is this gap which a new criminal offence seeks to fill. The authors suggest how such an offence should be structured, drawing primarily upon foundational principles of criminal liability. It is suggested that a new general offence of wilfully neglecting or ill-treating a patient that can be committed by any healthcare organisation or worker (appropriately defined) is warranted.

Conclusions:
The criminal law has an important role to play in the healthcare context. Its central function is not primarily to deter and coerce people into complying with standards of behaviour deemed desirable. Rather, its central function lies in its symbolic and expressive significance, publicly proclaiming that the highly culpable mistreatment of others is wrongful and worthy of public censure and sanction.

This paper interrogates the predisposition in favour of informal, low-intervention control styles of enforcement advocated by the ‘better regulation’ movement, and which resonates throughout the Hampton Report recommendations which are currently being implemented in the UK. It focuses on three practices that reflect the trend towards diverting regulatory enforcement action away from the courts in favour of reliance on formal administrative sanctioning powers ranging from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’: the use of negotiated penalty settlements, the acceptance of administrative undertakings (‘enforcement undertakings’) and the provision of firm-specific compliance advice by regulators. Each practice is explored through various analytical lenses which enable the underlying constitutional tensions to be identified and interrogated. In so doing, it demonstrates how the emphasis on bargaining, negotiation and discussions between regulators and those they are responsible for regulating advocated by the UK better regulation movement may antagonise several constitutional values, including transparency, accountability, due process and participation, as well as several values associated with formal conceptions of the rule of law. On the other hand, resort to negotiation and discussion in regulatory enforcement can generate important benefits, largely in facilitating the timely, creative and cost-effective resolution of enforcement disputes while avoiding the formality, delay and hostility associated with formal court adjudication. This ‘clash of logics’ can be traced to inherent differences between bargaining, on the one hand, and adjudication on the other. Bargaining and adjudication represent two quite different and distinct forms of ordering through which disputes can be resolved, and it is these differences that lie at the foundation of their respective virtues and shortcomings when employed to resolve disputes concerning regulatory violations.

This is a critical review of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. Yale University Press (CT 2008).